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Six years ago the Soviet Politburo chose Mikhail Sergeyevich Gor 
bachev to lead the Communist party and the country. He must have 
been regarded by his colleagues as a firm and decisive political leader 
committed to the system he was selected to lead. He must also have 
been congenial to the wing of the party leadership that felt a profound 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy and was open to 
new ideas, even radical ideas, for changes that might improve its per 
formance. There is nothing in the record, however, to suggest that Gor 
bachev himself had any particular conception of what those changes 
ought to be.
The one idea he had been associated with for a long time was the so- 
called "brigade method" of production organization. The idea was to 
organize the workforce in each farm and factory in such a way that 
each group of workers, called a brigade, would be responsible for a 
clearly defined production task from beginning to end. For example, 
instead of paying some workers for plowing a field, others for planting 
it and others for harvesting it, one brigade would have the responsibil 
ity for all three tasks. The brigade would then be paid on the basis of 
the final quantity harvested. The workers would therefore have a mate 
rial interest in seeing to it that the plowing and all the other operations 
were done well; this is in contrast to the traditional method in which 
tractor drivers were paid for plowing a piece of land and could not be 
held accountable if poor plowing were responsible for a poor harvest. 
Gorbachev was a great promoter of the brigade method, both as party
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leader of his province of Stavropol, and later as a Politburo official in 
charge of agriculture.
The language of economic management at the time distinguished 
two methods of organizing economic activity. One was the "adminis 
trative method," in which people were told what job to perform and 
how to perform it by a manager or planning official. The other was the 
"economic method," which was designed to provide direct material 
incentives in a way that would motivate workers to do what the plan 
ners wanted them to do without having to be monitored at each stage. 
To be a radical in those days was to be a supporter of economic meth 
ods, stressing individual incentives over planning directives. The bri 
gade method is an example of an economic method, and Gorbachev, as 
a promoter of economic methods, must have represented the enlight 
ened radical wing of the party leadership.
This background is useful as a benchmark from which to judge the 
distance that the Soviet economic debate has progressed in those six 
years. Only in a few abstruse economic journals did the term "market" 
appear from time to time, and the term "privatization" was not to be 
found at all. Neither of those concepts could have been in the minds of 
the Politburo when the vote on the new General Secretary was taken. 
The man they elected must have distinguished himself not by a vision 
of a radically different Soviet economic system, but by his bold expres 
sion of dissatisfaction with the performance of the economy and by his 
advocacy of economic rather than administrative methods, which was 
the mark of a farseeing party leader of that time.
The reasons for the leadership's dissatisfaction with the perfor 
mance of the economy are well known and need little elaboration. The 
primary reason was the relative decline of the USSR in the economic- 
growth competition since the Second World War. In the late 1950s, the 
Soviet growth rate was more than twice that of the United States, and it 
exceeded all the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop 
ment countries except West Germany and Japan. Those were the years 
in which the Soviet leadership confidently believed that it was only a 
matter of time before their country would surpass the United States and 
outdistance the entire capitalist world. In the subsequent decades, the
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growth rate declined in many countries, but the decline was more rapid 
in the USSR. Consequently, by the end of the 1970s the Soviet growth 
rate was exceeded by the United States and by more than half of the 
OECD countries. 1 Moreover, the capitalist countries of the Pacific Rim 
were growing at such phenomenal rates that their per capita incomes 
were likely soon to overtake those of the USSR. The Soviet leadership 
no longer contemplated the gratifying prospect of surpassing the capi 
talist world, but instead now faced the dismal possibility of losing the 
economic capability of maintaining all the foreign and domestic com 
mitments undertaken in support of their superpower status in the past.
The leadership also shared a certain view about why the growth per 
formance of the economy had deteriorated so badly. Soviet economists 
had developed a mode of analysis of the sources of growth similar to 
the analysis of factor productivity that was developed in the West in the 
1960s.2 The Soviet analysis distinguished between "extensive" and 
"intensive" growth. The principal source of extensive growth is a 
growing stock of capital (as well as labor and land), while the principal 
source of intensive growth is the improved quality of the capital stock 
deriving from technological progress. The comparative analysis of 
economic growth in these terms showed that while the growth of the 
capitalist countries was primarily of the intensive kind, deriving from 
technological progress, Soviet growth was primarily of the extensive 
kind, deriving from heavy investment in increasing the capital stock. 
The meaning of this result was that the USSR had missed the boat of 
modern technological progress, and that was the major cause of declin 
ing growth performance relative to other countries. This line of analy 
sis was eventually accepted by the top leadership of the country, and 
the acceleration of technological progress had become a major theme 
in high-level government reports.
These were the economic concerns of the Communist party leader 
ship in 1985. They elected a General Secretary who looked as if he 
could shake the economy up in ways that would restore the high 
growth rates of the past and would accelerate technological progress to 
a rate appropriate for a great power.
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Soviet Economic Performance
The poor performance of the Soviet economy has been widely 
reported and is well known in the West This, however, is only one side 
of the story. If this side of the story says that things were pretty bad, 
there is another side of the story that says things weren't all that bad. 
This second side has not been widely reported in the press, perhaps for 
the same reason that lawful behavior is not widely reported but crimi 
nal behavior is. In both cases the preoccupation with pathology can 
give a distorted impression of the state of the society. In the Soviet 
case, the persistent reporting of the bad news, unrelieved by any good 
news, led to such hyperbolic expressions as "crisis" and "basket case." 
In the early 1980s, for example, there were reports that the new Reagan 
administration believed the Soviet economy to be so close to collapse 
that the need to respond to the Strategic Defense Initiative would be 
enough to push it over the edge.
That view lacked a sense of perspective. Things can be tough with 
out being ready to fall apart. In fact the Soviet economy in 1985 was 
still reasonably productive and stable, despite its poor record relative to 
the leading economies of the world. One need only look at the USSR 
today to recall how stable and productive it was six years ago. Two 
pieces of evidence may be cited.
Professor Abram Bergson calculated Soviet labor productivity to be 
58 percent of that of the United States in 1975. This compares with the 
United Kingdom at 75 percent, Spain at 68 percent, and Japan at 64 
percent of the United States. Some portion of the Soviet lag is due to 
the fact that the capital per worker is smaller in the USSR than in the 
other countries. Drawing on the experience of a group of capitalist 
countries, Bergson estimated Soviet labor productivity at about 73 per 
cent of that to be expected in a capitalist country that had the same cap 
ital per worker as the USSR.3 The finding is consistent with the 
common view that the Soviet economy's performance is significantly 
inferior to that of the capitalist economies, but on the other hand it does 
not depict an economy that is headed for disaster.4
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With respect to technological attainment, the most authoritative 
study is that of a research group of engineers and economists at the 
University of Birmingham, in England. Their study covered a range of 
industrial products such as chemical engineering, steelmaking, and 
computers. They found that in most fields of technology the USSR 
lagged behind the West, with the largest lags in the most rapidly 
advancing technologies like microelectronics. However, there was no 
evidence that the gap widened during the period 1956-1976.5 During 
those years technology was advancing very rapidly in the West, and 
since the Soviets managed to keep the gap from widening, their rate of 
technological progress must have been substantial. That is not a satis 
factory performance from the perspective of the Soviet leadership, for 
at those relative rates of technological advance the USSR would 
remain forever behind. There is also some evidence that the gap did 
widen somewhat after 1976, particularly in the crucial field of micro 
electronics. Yet the picture is one of a country with substantial techno 
logical capability, though not in the major league of world 
technological advance.
The significance of this second side of the story is that the Soviet 
leadership did not launch this massive economic transformation out of 
dire necessity. It was not an economy in shambles, and they were not 
under siege by hungry masses demanding change. It was not like 
China after Mao, where actual starvation occurred in parts of the coun 
try and the desperate peasants themselves dissolved the communes and 
divided the land into family farms. It was not like Poland in 1989 with 
inflation running at 1000 percent a year and the shops bare of many 
foodstuffs. Unlike those countries, the decision to undertake a radical 
change in the economic system was motivated by the conviction of the 
leadership that the continuation of business as usual would cause the 
USSR to fall continuously behind the rest of the world. By the end of 
the century, it was increasingly said, the Soviet Union would have 
become a Third World country.
Gorbachev's policy is therefore properly viewed as a "revolution 
from above," in the tradition of Peter the Great three hundred years
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earlier. That perspective—that it is a revolution from above—explains 
a great deal about the way in which the transition has evolved
First, it explains the extensive resistance, both active and passive, to 
the program of economic restructuring. The old system still delivered 
on some of its original promises, such as the elimination of capitalist- 
type unemployment. Virtually no factory had been closed down in the 
USSR since its inception, and no Soviet worker knew what it was like 
to "lose a job." Earnings were low, but bread and meat prices and 
apartment rents were also extremely low, so that everybody could 
afford them. Quality and availability were poor, but no one starved or 
went homeless. It was not a hungry population clamoring for a new 
system that, for all its promises, would bring unemployment and an 
end to the low prices on bread and housing. Gorbachev did succeed in 
marshaling the support of like-minded political and military leaders, 
and he kindled the enthusiasm of liberal intellectuals; but there was no 
large constituency demanding change, and there were large social 
groups, such as workers and bureaucrats, who felt threatened by radi 
cal change.
Second, it explains why the new government, committed to radical 
economic change, had only the vaguest idea of what kinds of changes 
it wanted to bring about Past governments had encouraged research on 
ways of improving the operation of the economic system, but never 
having doubted the fundamental soundness of that system, they had 
not authorized research on alternative systems. If there was a desert in 
the USSR, it was not in the economy or in the technology, but in the 
stock of economic ideas. The most radical ideas that had appeared in 
print were recommendations for making greater use of such economic 
methods as price and profit incentives, instead of administrative meth 
ods. No doubt many economists secretly harbored more radical ideas 
than that, but they were not part of the open economic discourse.
Third, and perhaps most important, it explains the other major com 
ponent of the transformation—democratization; particularly it explains 
glasnost, or freedom of expression. Gorbachev has sometimes been 
criticized for having weakened central political controls before eco 
nomic decentralization had been accomplished. The example of post-
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Mao China, as well as South Korea and Taiwan, is thought to demon 
strate that the combination of tight central political control with exten 
sive individual economic freedom is the best formula for rapid 
economic transformation.
Gorbachev believed, however, that that formula would not work in 
the USSR. For generations the party had preached the superiority of 
the Soviet socialist planned economy, the wisdom of the party's leader 
ship, the correctness and necessity of Stalin's heritage, and the freedom 
of Soviet citizens from the evils of unemployment and exploitation that 
plagued the capitalist world. With that history, it was impossible to 
announce one day that the system was now to be totally dismantled and 
replaced by one suspiciously similar to capitalism in many ways. The 
people had to be convinced that they had been lied to all these years— 
that Stalin had been a tyrant, that the system he introduced had 
destroyed rather than released the creative energies of the masses, that 
the Soviet people had fallen in lethargy and moral decay, and that the 
capitalists do a lot of things right and it was necessary to learn how to 
do them, even if the learning will be painful.
This is why glasnost was thought to be necessary. If Gorbachev had 
sought to undertake a radical change without loosening the political 
and ideological reins, he would have had to rely on the existing instru 
ments of power, the party and the economic bureaucracy. These organi 
zations had proven to be largely reform-resistant in the past, even to 
the modest within-system reforms introduced by past General Secre 
taries. In no way could they be counted on to execute the directives of 
a new General Secretary whose slogan was not simply the improve 
ment of the traditional economic system, but the complete reconstruc 
tion—perestroika—of that system into a new system that would have 
little use for planners and ministries.
I think Gorbachev was right. In the USSR at least, there could be no 
economic transformation without weakening the power of the party 
and the ministerial bureaucracy, without liberalization of personal 
expression, and without coming to terms with the past
Glasnost has been politically costly. It has released powerful forces 
of nationalism, separatism, xenophobia, and reaction. Nevertheless,
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without that political liberalization it would not have been possible to 
have gotten to the point today where a popularly elected Soviet Parlia 
ment is debating not whether to introduce private property and mar 
kets, but the speed and extent of privatization and marketization.
The proposals now before Parliament are so radical that the restruc 
turing efforts of the past six years look like ancient history. They were 
of crucial importance, however, in bringing the economy, and the 
debate about the economy, to the point it has reached today. I would 
like to discuss two developments that are fundamental in the restruc 
turing of the economy: first, changes in the rules of property owner 
ship; and second, changes in what the Soviets call "the economic 
mechanism" referring to planning or markets. I will then conclude with 
a brief discussion of two other developments that have greatly compli 
cated the transition to a restructured economy and may possibly bring 
the process to a halt. They are the onset of inflation, and the political 
conflict between the national and the republic governments.
Legalization of Private Property
The first significant break with the past under Gorbachev was the 
legalization of certain limited forms of private ownership of productive 
property. The most widespread form is the cooperative, in which two 
or more persons form an enterprise that operates much like our partner 
ship. Individual persons and their families are also permitted to engage 
in economic activity, but the cooperative has become the dominant 
form of the new private enterprise.6
Cooperatives are permitted to buy and own productive equipment, 
to hire wage labor, to produce and sell goods and services, and to deter 
mine their own prices rather than sell at the low state-controlled prices. 
The cooperators may retain the profit as their private income after pay 
ing taxes. They are typically engaged in such activities as the produc 
tion of clothing, restaurant services, small-scale construction, taxis, 
and repair services for automobiles, plumbing, consumer durables, and 
so forth.
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Cooperatives have encountered intense hostility from many sections 
of the public. Part of the reason is a general antipathy toward the eco 
nomic activities conducted by persons who are thought of as middle 
men, speculators, merchants, exploiters, and capitalists—sentiments 
long cultivated by Soviet propaganda but having deeper roots in tradi 
tional Russian culture. But there are more specific reasons.
The prices charged to the public are substantially higher in the coop 
eratives than in state stores. One reason is that their costs are higher. 
Cooperatives have to pay higher prices for their own supplies because 
they provide higher-quality goods and services. They also pay higher 
prices for many of the supplies they need than state enterprises have to 
pay.
In addition to higher costs, cooperative prices are higher because 
they often sell in markets where state-supplied products are sold at 
controlled prices far below market-clearing price levels. Cooperative 
prices, which have to cover costs, must therefore be sold at prices that 
are well above those in state stores. To the Soviet public, however, the 
cooperators are simply price gougers, and the growing shortages of 
goods in the state shops are thought to be due to the cooperatives that 
buy the goods cheap and sell them dear in their own shops. The income 
of cooperators are also much higher than the average, and they are not 
shy about flaunting their new wealth in conspicuously high living.
In addition to a hostile public, the cooperatives also face hostile 
local government officials who see in them a threat to what was for 
merly their monopoly of power. These officials have waged an effec 
tive rear-guard battle against the cooperatives, by denying them 
licenses, raising their tax rates, and impeding their access to supplies 
and to building space in which to conduct their business. Inevitably, 
relationships of this sort spawn corruption, including payoffs to politi 
cal and police officials and protection money to ordinary hoodlums, all 
of which further increases the cost of doing business and therefore the 
prices that cooperatives charge.
After this litany of obstacles, one might guess that very few cooper 
atives have succeeded. On the contrary, despite these handicaps, the 
cooperative movement has grown dramatically. The number of people
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employed in cooperatives grew from a few thousand initially to about 
4.5 million people last April. They are now reported to be producing 
almost 5 percent of the gross domestic product There is no doubt that 
the consumption levels of many Soviet citizens is significantly higher 
because of the co-ops, although higher-income citizens have benefited 
more than the less well-off. The movement also gives reason to believe 
that there are substantial untapped entrepreneurial talents in the Soviet 
population, contrary to the opinion of some Soviet observers that 70 
years of socialism has destroyed that talent.
More significant than the growth in the number of cooperatives is 
the accumulation of experience. Millions of Soviet citizens have 
learned how to figure out what other people want to buy, how to 
acquire materials, equipment and labor, and how to figure costs. They 
have learned how to borrow from the State Bank, and some coopera 
tives have banded together to form their own cooperative banks. Some 
have learned how to attract and work with foreigners in joint ventures; 
it was a cooperative that almost pulled off the notorious export of mili 
tary tanks that created something of a sensation last year.7 The quiet 
and steady accumulation of business experience by the cooperatives 
may in the long run prove to be the major development during these six 
years in preparing the country for the move to a market economy.
Until last year, the legalization of cooperative and individual enter 
prise was the major change in the property ownership rules of the 
economy. There was little echo in the USSR of the tempestuous move 
ment in Eastern Europe to proceed with the privatization of the huge 
sector of state-owned enterprises. That has now changed. The so-called 
"500-day plan" proposed to change the ownership forms of almost all 
of the state-owned enterprises. Smaller workshops and retail stores 
were to be auctioned off, to be run as private enterprises. Larger state 
enterprises were to be converted to joint stock companies, the shares to 
be transferred eventually to citizens. State ownership would continue 
only in defense industry and in natural monopolies such as railways 
and electric grids.8
The 500-day plan was adopted by the Russian republic, but only a 
considerably watered-down form of it was adopted by the USSR
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Supreme Soviet. Privatization is becoming a major issue dividing the 
liberals from the conservatives. In light of the conservative swing in 
Soviet politics at present, clearly supported by Gorbachev, privatiza 
tion does not have a bright future at this time. Barring a radical shift in 
political power, the legalization of private enterprise rather than priva 
tization of state enterprise is likely to be the extent of the restructuring 
of ownership rules in the Soviet economy for some time to come.
The 1987 State Enterprise Law
The second fundamental feature of an economic system is the mech 
anism employed for coordinating the transactions of the millions of 
enterprises and economic agents. Modern history knows only two 
mechanisms of this kind—markets and planning. Before the Russian 
Revolution, markets were the predominant mechanism in modern 
economies. Economic planning was the great Soviet contribution to the 
repertory of economic institutions.
For 70 years, Soviet ideology had preached the evils of capitalist 
markets and the superiority of socialist planning. Again, it took the pol 
icy of glasnost to launch the debate in which many people learned for 
the first time how badly the planning mechanism had in fact operated, 
and how and why markets do many things better than planning. The 
growing pressure for marketization finally bore some fruit in the cru 
cial State Enterprise Law of 1987.
The law declared that state-owned enterprises should thereafter 
decide for themselves what to produce, rather than be directed by the 
planners on what to produce. They should also negotiate with other 
enterprises for their supplies, rather than have their supplies allocated 
to them by the planners. They should compete with each other for 
sales, and in making their production and supply decisions they should 
seek to maximize their profit. If fully implemented, those provisions of 
the law would have the effect of substantially replacing the central 
planning mechanism by a market mechanism.
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That was July 1987. Marketization has proceeded to some degree, 
but Soviet economists are uniformly agreed that it has not proceeded 
very far. The reasons may be seen in two of the many problems 
encountered in the implementation of the law.
First, to protect the economy against the possibility that the new and 
untried market system might fail—not an unreasonable precaution— 
the planners were given the right to issue to enterprises plan directives 
of the old kind—now called "state orders"—if in their judgment the 
new and untried system might not produce the required quantities of all 
commodities.
In fact, many enterprises felt unready to take the plunge. On the pro 
duction side, they were used to producing what they were told by a 
ministry to produce, with the ministry then arranging for the sale of 
their products. Now they were told to figure out for themselves what 
and how much to produce. What if they produced too much and could 
not sell it? They were used to the ministry informing them how much 
fuel, iron and other supplies they were to receive, and who their suppli 
ers would be. Now they were told that they must find their own suppli 
ers, in an economy where everything was in short supply. What if they 
could not find suppliers willing and able to sell them as much as they 
needed?
To protect themselves from such pitfalls, many enterprises pleaded 
with their ministries to issue them state orders for as much of their pro 
duction as possible. Producing in response to a state order guaranteed 
that the ministry would accept responsibility for the sale of the product 
and also arrange for the required supplies to be made available. The 
ministries, in turn, were happy to issue state orders liberally because 
the new law placed them in an administratively impossible situation: 
they continued to be responsible for the performance of their enter 
prises, but they were deprived of the power to tell their enterprises 
what to do.
The result was that in the first year in which the new law was in 
operation, state orders—which are equivalent to the old central plan 
ning—accounted for a huge proportion of industrial output, ranging 
from 90 percent to 100 percent in some industries.9 Despite the criti-
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cism of reformers, most output continues to be produced under central 
planning rather than market conditions. Former Prime Minister Ryzh- 
kov expressed the hope that production under state orders could be 
reduced to 40 percent by 1991,10 but there seems little likelihood that 
so sharp a decline in central control will be brought about so rapidly.
The story reflects the anxieties and the conflicting forces associated 
with the transition from planning to markets. But such anxiety ought to 
be expected in the circumstances. It is indeed something of an achieve 
ment that many enterprises are now operating without state orders for 
some or all of their output and are evidently learning how to market 
their products and how to contract for the delivery of their material 
supplies. Auctions, bazaars, fairs and barter trade are some of the spon 
taneous developments of new institutions that may prove to be the 
forerunners of genuine markets. 11 This part of the story of the 1987 law 
is one of an initial setback, but also of the beginnings of a gradual 
accommodation to the needs of a market system.
The second problem of the 1987 law derives from the fact that dur 
ing the transition the economy is neither fully marketized nor fully 
planned, but is some combination of the two. Under such circum 
stances, some highly undesirable phenomena can occur.
For example, in response to the law's instruction to enterprises to 
maximize profit, managers set about seeking the most profitable items 
to produce, and dropping the production of items that yielded losses or 
very little profit. As a result, some products began to disappear from 
the shops, with unfortunate consequences. The saddest case occurred 
when hospitals suddenly discovered that they were unable to obtain 
disposable hypodermic needles. It turned out that the director of the 
only enterprise producing syringes, wishing to be a good citizen under 
perestroika, found that they were not profitable and switched to the 
production of more profitable items. Similar sudden shortages occurred 
in the case of soap, matches, aspirin, cigarettes and other items.
The reason for these episodes is that the state still controls most 
prices, of which there are many millions. It is impossible for the state 
price controllers to set all prices at the levels that will induce profit- 
maximizing managers to produce just those things that consumers
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most desire. Under central planning, the inability of the price control 
lers to set such prices was of little importance, because the ministry 
would simply order its enterprises to produce soap and syringes, 
regardless of their profitability. But when the ministry no longer has 
that right, production can go badly awry if prices do not respond 
quickly to shortages.
The lesson of the State Enterprise Law is that before markets can be 
expected to work well, a great many different institutional arrange 
ments must be in place: legal institutions for enforcing contracts, bank 
ing and credit institutions, accounting and auditing institutions, price 
determining arrangements, and so forth. If some of them are not yet 
functioning, the market system can perform very badly; indeed an 
incomplete market system might perform worse than a coherent central 
planning system.
Some disruptions of these kinds are an unavoidable cost of transi 
tion. It is for this reason that some people advocate a very rapid transi 
tion from planning to markets—the faster the better—to minimize 
these costs. Too rapid a transition has its own costs, however, for it 
leaves too little time to prepare the ground for markets to work prop 
erly. Unfortunately, there is very little experience in this type of transi 
tion from which informed judgments may be made. In 1917, Russia 
was the guinea pig for testing the world's first transition—from mar 
kets to planning. Today, the USSR is again a guinea pig, this time for 
testing the world's first reverse transition—from planning to markets.
Inflation
Under the best of circumstances, the story of the progress of pere- 
stroika should end here, with an account of changes in the two funda 
mental features of an economy—ownership rules and the economic 
mechanism. Unfortunately, other changes have occurred in the country 
that have greatly complicated the transition. The two that are of great 
est significance are the onset of inflation and the conflict between the 
union and the republics.
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Before 1985, Soviet fiscal and monetary policy had been extremely 
conservative. The government budget was roughly in balance from 
year to year, and wage payments were under tight control.
Around 1987, things began to come apart. Government expendi 
tures continued to rise while revenues began to decline. Some of the 
causes were beyond the government's control, such as the Cheraobyl 
nuclear plant accident and the Armenian earthquake. Others were the 
consequence of ill-advised government policies, such as the fervent 
anti-alcoholism campaign that sharply reduced government revenues 
from the alcohol tax. The State Enterprise Law, which permitted enter 
prises to retain a larger share of their profits, resulted in a further reduc 
tion in government revenues.
The consequence was a rapidly increasing government budget defi 
cit, which amounted to about 10 percent of the gross national product 
in 1989. 12 Unable to finance the deficit by domestic or foreign borrow 
ing, the government did what beleaguered governments often do in 
such straits—it printed new money.
As a result the money incomes of the population increased more 
rapidly than the production of the consumer goods and services. In a 
market economy, that would have led to price increases—open infla 
tion. Marketization of the Soviet economy, however, has not yet 
extended to the determination of retail prices by market forces. Prices 
are still set by the government and remain fixed for long periods of 
time. The rising money incomes of the population are then expressed 
in the form of repressed inflation. The weekly delivery of meat to the 
state store, which formerly may have lasted for six days, is now all sold 
out after five days, then after four days. The population soon learns to 
shop early in the week, the queues grow longer, and eventually the 
week's delivery is sold out the day it arrives. That is the dynamic that 
has led to the grim phenomenon of empty shelves in the state stores 
while the unspent cash balances in the hands of the population con 
tinue to rise.
These effects of repressed inflation have been disastrous for the 
progress of perestroika. It has led to a declining sense of consumer 
welfare, which many people blame on the abandonment of tight central
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planning in favor of markets and cooperatives. 13 It has reduced con 
sumer resistance to the evasion of price controls by profit-seeking state 
enterprises. It has fostered the expansion of the black market. The 
declining value of a ruble of wages had eroded labor discipline and 
work incentives. It has aggravated the hostility to the cooperatives 
whose market-based prices diverge more and more from the fixed sub 
sidized state-store prices.
The opinion is universal that the restoration of macroeconomic 
equilibrium is an absolute precondition to any further progress in pere- 
stroika. The government has, in fact, set forth a program for reducing 
the deficit, consisting primarily of a reduction in expenditures, but with 
some increases in revenues. Despite this broad agreement, it is difficult 
to be sanguine about the prospect for arresting the inflationary pres 
sures for two reasons, both political.
First, no government finds it easy to eliminate a budget deficit, espe 
cially when it involves political commitments to expenditures that 
entail a deficit as high as 10 percent of GNP. Even strong governments 
find that difficult, and the Soviet Union's government is particularly 
weak at this time.
Second, all the plans for perestroika, even the radical 500-day plan, 
exclude so-called "essential consumer goods" from the list of com 
modities whose prices are to be set free to reach market levels. The 
government is to continue to fix the prices of foodstuffs and housing, 
presumably at the same low levels that prevailed in the past. Those low 
prices, which the population has long grown to regard as one of the 
few benefits of socialism, are maintained by government subsidies. 
The subsidies on agricultural products alone are now roughly equal to 
the entire budget deficit. 14 Neither the government nor its principal crit 
ics are prepared to bit the bullet of food price increases. Gorbachev 
himself remarked that such price increases "would make the whole 
people take to the streets and topple any government."15 Indeed, the 
loudest protest against one timid attempt to raise food prices came 
from Boris Yeltsin, who represents himself as being impatient with the 
slow pace of perestroika.
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One can only conclude that the political leadership across the entire 
spectrum is scared to death of the popular reaction to an increase in 
basic consumer prices. They do not have the confidence of the Solidar 
ity-based government in Poland that they could persuade the people of 
the necessity of bearing the hardships that would be involved in such 
measures as the introduction of a market-pricing system for all com 
modities and the restoration of a balanced budget. As long as these 
conditions prevail, the prospect of any significant expansion of market 
relationships seems quite remote. It is ironic that this monetary prob 
lem, which has nothing to do with perestroika itself, has mushroomed 
into a major obstacle to its further progress.
Political Legitimacy
One of the fruits of political liberalization is the intense conflict 
between the national government and the member republics. The con 
flict is a compound of a number of elements, including ethnic violence 
in places like Armenia and Azerbaijan, separatist forces in places like 
the Baltic republics, and demands for sovereignty in such republics as 
Russia and the Ukraine.
There can be no more fundamental requirement for a stable society 
than general agreement on who has the legitimate right to govern. In 
the absence of such agreement the society is prey to chaos or civil war 
as contending groups struggle for power, each in the conviction of the 
rightness of its cause. As the political conflict ripens, it takes its toll on 
economic activity. An order from the national government that prices 
on luxuries be raised was not enforced in the Russian republic by order 
of its government. An increase in the price of meat in Russia caused a 
flurry of shipments of meat from the Ukraine to Russia. The Ukrainian 
government responded by forbidding the export of meat to Russia. 
Ukrainian officials claim that Russia then retaliated by cutting off ship 
ments of oil supplies to the Ukraine. 16 Similar protectionist skirmishes 
have been breaking out all over the union. Foreign investors have 
already acknowledged increased uncertainty in business dealings
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because one cannot be sure that the Soviet signatory of a delivery con 
tract will be sustained as having had the lawful right to sign it 17
Neither Soviet history nor world history offers much hope that the 
deep problem of political legitimacy will be easily solved. One must 
expect very turbulent times ahead, perhaps for many years. Until that 
issue is somehow resolved—if only provisionally—the prospect is for 
little further progress in economic transformation and further deterio 
ration in economic performance.
Conclusion
After six years in office, the Gorbachev government has made a 
modest start in the transition from the central planning to the new 
economy of the future. Instead of universal state ownership of enter 
prise, a lawful place has been made for private enterprise. Instead of 
total central control over the output of state enterprises, some portion 
of that output is now produced by the decisions of the enterprises 
themselves, not bound by "state orders."
To those Soviet citizens who saw the election of the new General 
Secretary as the beginning of a truly radical transformation of the eco 
nomic system, the results thus far are disappointing. Moreover, the 
economy today is in a much poorer condition than before 1985. Total 
output and consumption per capita are in fact higher than in 1985,18 but 
because of the disorder in consumer goods markets, there is a general 
feeling of being worse off than before.
If one is of an optimistic disposition, there are some signs of things 
happening that may help the transition move forward. Several million 
people in the new private sector are learning the managerial and finan 
cial skills of business enterprise. Thousands of others have engaged in 
joint ventures with foreign capitalist firms and are absorbing the tech 
niques of international management and finance. Profits are being 
earned and private money capital is accumulating that may one day 
serve to purchase the assets of some privatized state enterprises. Man 
agers of some state enterprises are learning how to do business with
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each other, instead of taking orders from their ministries, and the rudi 
ments of market relationships are spreading. Some republican govern 
ments are seeking to curb protectionist impulses, and tentative 
accommodations are sometimes arrived at even between such contend 
ers as the national government under Gorbachev and the Russian 
republican government under Boris Yeltsin. 19 Historians may some day 
conclude that while the country was absorbed in the dramatic turmoil 
of high politics, these grassroots developments were quietly forming 
the foundation for a subsequent major transformation of the economy. 
While the optimist can find some encouragement in this perspective, 
there is little prospect for a sharp resumption of the transition process 
in the next year or two. Among the principal reasons are the difficulty 
of dealing with the inflation and with the union-republic political con 
flict The latter problem in particular has caused the sharp reversal in 
the process of political liberalization that Gorbachev has been leading 
in the last few months. This conservative reaction may well lead to a 
complete halt or even a reversal in the economic process of pere- 
stroika, although that is by no means foreordained. Should such a 
reversal occur, the old central planning system, perhaps somewhat 
modified, may gain a new lease on life. While it may endure for a 
period of time, however, there is no reason to expect that the restored 
planned economy would perform significantly better than it did in the 
past A reaction of that sort would therefore only postpone the date on 
which some future General Secretary will be called on to lead a new 
effort at economic perestroika,
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